On the synchronisation of election dates. The small vis-a-vis large economies case

The paper examines some of the issues related to the synchronisation
of election dates between two economies. In particular, it analyses the
circumstances in which a government of a single country, considered to be a
small economy, has incentives (or not), to synchronise the domestic election
dates with the election dates (not necessarily determined in an endogenous
way) of a country performing the role of an ‘anchor’, considered to be a
large economy. To achieve this purpose, the paper uses, as an illustration,
an asymmetric version of the model in Miller and Salmon (1990) in order
to derive the optimal domestic electoral period length, which, in this sense,
can be considered to be endogenously determined. The paper then shows
how elections should occur in the small economy in order to benefit from the
performance of the large economy. As a particularly relevant result it is shown
that the incentive to synchronise the election dates depends upon the inflation
history of the economies.
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